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Some people have argued that fiscal decentralization may
improve welfare not only directly, but also indirectly by
helping alleviate such other problems as economic develop-
ment, revenue mobilization (see box 1), innovation in public
service delivery, accountability of elected officials, capacity
development at the local government level, and grassroots
participation in governance. What more can one ask? 
However, to be successful in attaining the potential ben-
efits from decentralization, subnational governments must
have the power to control their employees, and local resi-
dents must have the power to control their governments
(normally through elections). Moreover, there must be suf-
ficiently accurate information available for voters to evaluate
the fiscal decisions of local governments, and sufficient in-
centive and interest for them to exercise their power respon-
sibly. Unfortunately, in many developing countries, few if
any of these conditions may be satisfied. 
Significant tax assignment to subnational governments is
common in developed countries: in Sweden and other Scan-
dinavian countries, for example, local income taxes are im-
portant, whereas state and local governments in the United
States often impose both sales and income taxes. In most de-
veloping countries, however, central governments have been
reluctant to release taxing powers to subnational govern-
ments. On average, the subnational tax share of total taxes
in developing countries is only about 10 percent, or less than
half  of  that  in  industrial  countries. These  figures  have
changed little in the last 30 years (Bahl and Bird 2008). The
result is that most subnational government expenditures in
developing countries are financed through transfers (includ-
ing shares of national taxes, usually distributed on a formula
basis). As a rule, even the few taxes that subnational govern-
ments have are costly and difficult to administer. This note
discusses the case for improving the design and increasing
the role of such taxes. 
Assigning Subnational Taxes
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism prescribes a very
limited tax base for subnational governments. The only good
local taxes are said to be those that are easy to administer lo-
cally, are imposed solely (or mainly) on local residents, and
do not raise problems of harmonization or competition be-
tween subnational—local or regional—governments or be-
tween subnational and national governments. The only ma-
jor revenue source that passes these stringent tests is usually
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vehicles and user charges and fees. Because central govern-
ments generally are reluctant to provide subnational govern-
ments with access to more lucrative sales or income taxes, it
is not surprising that, to some extent, property tax–driven
decentralization has become both conventional wisdom and
common practice in many developing countries. 
There may be good reasons why central governments of-
ten are reluctant to give much tax discretion to local govern-
ments. For instance, they may fear losing some degree of
macroeconomic control. In addition, fiscal decentralization
may shift resources from central governments that have
higher rates of capital spending to regional and local govern-
ments that spend relatively more on consumption goods and
services. If the result is a lower overall rate of useful spending
on infrastructure, national growth could be harmed. Similar-
ly, fiscal decentralization may shift the composition of public
capital investments away from national priorities. Moreover,
if fiscal decentralization takes the path of increasing reliance
on  own-source  revenues,  then  local  governments  with
greater fiscal capacity (such as large cities in which there is
both a larger tax base that is easier to reach and a better
chance of developing the administrative capacity to collect
taxes) have an advantage; and regional inequality is likely to
increase. Finally, revenue decentralization may result in high-
er administrative and compliance costs.
Counterarguments may be made to support increasing lo-
cal tax autonomy. For instance, local residents are likely to
hold officials more accountable if local public services are fi-
nanced to a significant extent from locally imposed taxes
and charges that local residents must pay, rather than from
central government transfers. Local taxes should be both vis-
ible to local voters and large enough to impose a noticeable
burden that cannot be easily exported to nonresidents. Re-
liance on own-source taxes has the important advantage of
imposing fiscal discipline on subnational governments. Re-
quiring local governments to finance a greater share of ex-
penditures from their own revenue sources drives up the tax
price of public services and, hence, tends to reduce upward
pressure on subnational government expenditures. In con-
trast, heavy reliance on intergovernmental transfers—the
common situation in most developing countries—has pre-
cisely the opposite effect of expanding local demand for in-
creased public services (financed largely by others), unless
unusually great care is devoted to ensuring that transfers
have no effects at the spending margin (Bird and Smart
2002).
Principles of Revenue Assignment
Who should levy what taxes and how effectively they can
do so have been major issues in some countries. This is not
surprising because the correct revenue assignment in a mul-
tilevel government structure is not at all clear in principle
and often is controversial in practice. There are two funda-
mental problems: 
1. The central government inherently can collect most
taxes more efficiently than can subnational govern-
ments (vertical im  balance).
2. The potential tax bases available to the subnational
governments vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion (horizontal imbalance). 
To some extent, vertical imbalance may be solved if sub-
national governments are permitted to impose variable sur-
charges (per  haps within a set range) on central taxes. How-
ever, even if the vertical imbalance issue can be resolved by
adjusting revenue assignments, the degree of horizontal im-
balance is invariably worsened by decentralizing taxing pow-
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Box 1. Decentralization and Increased Revenue Mobilization
In principle, fiscal decentralization may increase revenue mo-
bilization by involving subnational governments more directly
in taxation. Typically, central governments rely on a combina-
tion of company income tax, individual income tax, value
added tax, and excises and customs duties. In many de  -
veloping countries, however, small firms, most individuals,
and owners of immovable property are all underrepresented
in the tax base as the result of the combination of high entry
levels (thresholds) and widespread evasion. 
Subnational governments may have the poten  tial and—if
the intergovernmental transfer system is properly designed so
as not to penalize success in revenue raising—the incentive
to reach this tax base. In that case, increases in subnational
government tax revenues will not be offset by reductions in
central government tax revenues; instead, they will reduce the
need for intergovernmental transfers from central revenues. 
To an extent in some countries, local governments do seem
to have broadened the tax base by employing a variety of tax
instruments and by taking such administrative measures as
placing levies on the sales of firms’ assets, requiring licenses
to operate, establishing betterment charges, and creating var-
ious forms of property taxation. 
Such taxes and charges often are unpopular with those
who pay them, and some may constitute an unduly costly and
undesirable burden on new businesses. However, they do il-
lustrate that—at least in some instances—decentralized gov-
ernments may have a comparative advantage in raising rev-
enue  because  they  have  ample  opportunity  to  identify
businesses in the community and to gain some knowledge
about those firms’ assets and the scale of their operations. ers because those who have more to tax are obviously better
off under this system than are those who are less favored.
Consequently, in countries where interjurisdictional dispar-
ities are a concern, more decentralized taxes imply a need
for more equalizing transfers to poorer regions.
Four basic principles for assigning revenues to subnational
governments may be suggested: 
1. Efficiency—Subnational taxes should not unduly dis-
tort the allocation of resources.
2. Accountability—Governments at all levels should bear
significant responsibility at the margin for financing
the expenditures for which they are politically respon-
sible. 
3. Sufficiency—Ideally, own-source revenues should be
sufficient to enable at least the richest subnational gov-
ernments to finance from their own resources all local-
ly provided services that primarily benefit local resi-
dents. 
4. Localization—Subnational taxes should burden only
local residents (and businesses), preferably in relation
to the perceived benefits they receive from local serv-
ices. 
Economists often emphasize the first of those criteria, ef-
ficiency. The importance of the second criterion, accounta-
bility, has already been noted briefly. Sufficiency, the third
criterion, focuses on fiscal imbalances: it is motivated by the
argument that the lighter the load put on intergovernmental
fiscal transfers, the more likely it is that they will be able to
do their job adequately. Finally, although the last criterion
listed, localization, is related both to reducing distortion (cri-
terion 1) and increasing accountability (criterion 2), it also
reflects a common assumption with respect to subnational
finance—namely, that the principal task of subnational gov-
ernments cannot and should not be income redistribution.
Although local governments often are critical deliverers of
services to the poor, they are seldom well suited to play any
substantial redistributive role in terms of financing such
services.
What Is a Good Subnational Tax?
Among the characteristics that might be sought in a good
subnational tax are the following:
• The tax base should be relatively im  mobile so local au-
thorities have some leeway in varying rates without
risking the loss of too much tax base.
• The tax yield should be adequate to meet local needs
and sufficiently buoyant over time to cover expected
increases in the local expenditures being financed.
• The tax yield should be relatively stable and predictable
over time to facilitate development and implementa-
tion of sound local fiscal practices.
• To strengthen local accountability, it should not be pos-
sible to export much, if any, of the tax burden to non-
residents.
• The tax base should be visible, again to ensure account-
ability.
• To be acceptable, the tax should be perceived by tax-
payers as reasonably fair.
• The tax should be relatively easy to administer effi-
ciently and effectively so that the cost of administra-
tion is a “reasonable” proportion of revenue collections
and that compliance costs (those incurred by taxpay-
ers) are relatively low (see box 2).
Not everyone may agree that all these characteristics are
necessarily or equally desirable. For example, is it unequivo-
cally good that subnational governments be insulated either
from the tax base consequences of their tax rate choices or
from inflation? Moreover, the characteristics that may be
sought in a local tax that is ideal from the point of view of
local governments may not be compatible with the charac-
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Box 2. Administering Local Taxes
The key characteristic of a “local” tax in terms of accounta-
bility is that the local (or regional) government should be po-
litically responsible for the tax imposed. That usually requires
the local government to be able (perhaps within limits) to set
the tax rate. However, neither this nor any other assignment
principle requires that local taxes be administered by the local
government.
The issue of administration thus can be considered apart from
the revenue assignment issue. Many ways of organizing sub-
national tax administration exist in different countries. In the
United States, at one extreme, each local government may be
responsible for administering its own taxes. At the other ex-
treme, there may be only one tax authority responsible for ad-
ministering the taxes at all levels of government. Although no
country appears to go quite that far, Canada has moved a long
way down the path with respect to provincial taxes, and coun-
tries such as Denmark have both an integrated information
system and strong operational synergies between levels of
government. In some cases, the “national” tax authority may
be directed by a board that includes significant representation
from subnational governments. There are countries in which
subnational governments may even be responsible for much
of the administrative work involved in administering some na-
tional taxes. In others (often regarding the property tax, for ex-
ample), one level of government may establish the tax base
(the cadastre) while another level (or levels) sets rates and
both collects and enforces the tax. teristics that are ideal from the central government’s per-
spective. Both levels might agree that the tax base should be
immobile, and perhaps that tax yields should be stable and
adequate to meet local needs. But central governments
should be concerned also about ensuring that little, if any, of
the tax burden is exported to nonresidents and that the local
tax base is visible to provide accountability. Subnational gov-
ernments are likely to view such attributes quite differently.
Finally, because not all subnational governments are the
same, the appropriate tax mix in most countries is likely to
differ not only between regional and local governments, but
also among governments of different sizes and complexities
at each level.
Decentralization and Fiscal Autonomy
Unless local governments have a significant degree of free-
dom to alter the level and composition of their revenues,
neither local autonomy nor its essential partner, local ac-
countability, can be achieved. In particular, some degree of
rate flexibility with respect to a significant component of lo-
cal revenues seems essential if local taxes are to be both ad-
equately responsive to local needs and decisions and instru-
mental in making local leaders more accountable to their
citizens.
A potential danger in permitting local governments even
limited freedom to tax is that they may not use fully all the
revenue sources open to them for fear of fiscal competition
or adverse political consequences, thus allowing the level
and quality of public services to deteriorate—the infamous
“race to the bottom.” Of course, if the service in question is
one of national importance or one in which there is a strong
national interest in maintaining standards, it presumably
should be funded and the extent to which it is achieved
should be monitored by the central government. Even with
respect to strictly local services, if intergovernmental fiscal
transfers are properly designed, this monitoring should not
be a problem (Bird and Smart 2002). 
In the ideal world envisaged in the fiscal federalism litera-
ture, if local residents do not like what their local government
does or does not do, they may (try to) “throw the rascals out”
at the next election. To put this another way, the freedom to
make mistakes and to bear the consequences is an important
component of local autonomy in any country. Indeed, unless
subnational governments are given some degree of freedom
with respect to local revenues, including the freedom to make
mistakes (for which they are accountable to their citizens), re-
sponsible and responsive subnational government is unlikely
to develop. If, as in many developing countries, there are inad-
equate mechanisms for local accountability, or if those who
fail to collect local taxes or to spend revenues efficiently are
bailed out by discretionary transfers, countries are likely to
have both problems in managing decentralization and less-
than-satisfactory policy outcomes. 
Another danger is that subnational governments may at-
tempt to extract revenues from sources for which they are
not accountable, thus obviating the basic efficiency argu-
ment for their existence. To avoid this problem, it may be
desirable to take two steps:
1. Limit the access of subnational governments to taxes
that fall mainly on nonresidents—such as most natural
resource levies, preretail-stage sales taxes, and, to some
extent, even nonresidential real property taxes. 
2. Establish a uniform set of tax bases for local govern-
ments (perhaps differing for such categories as big
cities, small towns, and rural areas), with a limited
amount of rate flexibility providing room for local ef-
fort while restraining unproductive competition and
unwarranted exploitation. 
If inappropriate tax bases are assigned to subnational gov-
ernments, wasteful competition and undesirable tax export-
ing may result. Moreover, when inadequate tax bases are as-
signed, the result may be the imposition of a variety of
undesirable  and  distortionary  fees,  levies,  and  informal
charges—often outside the normal budgetary process. In
such instances, it is common for central governments to
blame incompetent or corrupt local governments for such
undesirable outcomes. In reality, however, the fault may lie
less with subnational politicians and officials (who, for the
most part, are simply responding to an implicit incentive
structure that allows them to shift tax burdens to others, to
impose taxes and charges irresponsibly, or perhaps to de-
mand and receive increased transfers or borrow irresponsi-
bly) than with the central government that established such
a dysfunction  al structure.
Smarter Subnational Taxation
However subnational tax systems develop in the future in
developing countries, it is clear that much can and should be
done to strengthen the deficient property taxes already in
place in most countries. For example, the property tax
should be simplified and applied uniformly. Cadastral maps
should be updated and valuations made more consistently
and currently. Improved use should be made of information
flows from property registries, local building license author-
ities, public utilities, and so forth. In addition, close attention
generally should be paid to im  proving the “sharp end”—col-
lection and enforcement—and the technically more costly
(and less immediately productive in terms of revenue) map-
ping and surveying of the traditional cadastral approach. 
Although the property tax is a useful, even necessary
source of local revenue, it seldom can provide sufficient re-
sources to finance a significant expansion of local public
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hard-pressed even to maintain the present low relative im-
portance of property tax revenues. Although the assessment
and collection of property taxes certainly can be improved
in most developing countries, it is difficult to administer
these taxes equitably in a rapidly changing environment; and
it is always difficult to greatly or quickly increase revenues
from this source. Nonetheless, a low-rate, uniform property
tax has an important role to play in financing local govern-
ments, whether urban or rural; indeed, such a tax is probably
the only general tax source available in most rural areas. 
Apart from user charges (including those related to motor
vehicles), which are not discussed here, the other main
source of own revenue found in many countries is some
form of local business tax or license system. Whether or not
there is an economic case for such taxes, the political reality
is that practically any subnational government permitted to
impose such levies does so. Given the restrictions on (and
unpopularity of) residential property taxes and the unrelia-
bility of central transfers in many developing countries, most
property taxes are imposed on businesses. In addition, other
business taxes often provide almost the only way in which
subnational governments have been able to expand revenues
in response to perceived local needs.
To an extent, there is an economic case for some local
business taxation. Where it is not feasible to recoup the mar-
ginal cost of cost-reducing public sector outlays through user
charges, a form of broad-based general levy on business ac-
tivity may be warranted. If this is the rationale, from an eco-
nomic perspective, it may be argued that the best form of
tax on business might be a nondistorting low-rate, broad-
based tax similar to those imposed by subnational govern-
ments in Italy (the IRAP); and, more recently, in both Japan
(the modified enterprise tax) and France (the new uniform
business tax). For further discussion, see Bird (2005).
Finally, intermediate regional governments in some coun-
tries are responsible for important and expensive services,
such as health, education, and welfare. These expenditures
often are financed largely through central government trans-
fers. However, when regional governments are also expected
to contribute to financing such services, they often need ac-
cess to some broader revenue source—perhaps income or
consumption taxes. Because these tax bases also are the main
revenue sources for central government, maintaining an ef-
ficient, effective, and accountable public sector can be a
tricky problem. Although detailed discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this note, the key to resolving these
complex problems is to keep in mind the close interdepend-
ence between the assignment of expenditures and revenues
between levels and units of government and the design and
role of intergovernmental transfers (Bird 2010). 
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